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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 940544 
PATRICIA BUCZYNSKI, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, and UTAH STATE 
UNIVERSITY, 
Respondents/Appellee. Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case has been returned to the Court of Appeals by the 
Utah Supreme Court for a decision on the merits following a 
decision in the applicant's favor on writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue in this case is whether the "continuous coverage" 
rule mandates compensation for the applicant's slip and fall in 
McGaheysville, Virginia. 
The Court of Appeals reviews for correctness in this instance 
Morton International v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Applicant was injured in a fall in McGaheysville, Virginia on 
March 26, 1992. She applied for worker's compensation benefits. 
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge on October 
19, 1993. Her claim was denied. Applicant filed a motion for 
review, which was denied. She filed an appeal which was dismissed 
by the Court of Appeals in a decision dated January 25, 1995, The 
Supreme Court granted a Writ of Certiorari, and in a decision dated 
May 21, 1996, reinstated applicant's appeal on the merits and 
returned the case to the Court of Appeals for a decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Patricia Buczynski was employed by Utah State University 
as a professor in 1992. (Administrative Law Judge's decision, 
Findings of Fact, page 2.) 
2. Ms. Buczynski flew to Washington, D.C. on March 24, 1992. 
(Findings of Fact, page 2.) 
3. From March 24, 1992 until March 30, 1992, Ms. Buczynski 
remained either in Baltimore, Maryland or McGaheysville, Virginia. 
(Findings of Fact, pages 2 and 3). 
4. On March 26, 1992, Ms. Buczynski slipped and fell in a 
pool area of the hotel she was staying at in McGaheysville, 
Virginia. (Findings of Fact, pages 2 and 3). 
5. McGaheysville, Virginia is approximately 150 miles from 
Baltimore, Maryland and 100 miles from the Washington, D.C. 
airport. (Findings of Fact, page 2). 
6. Ms. Buczynski flew to the East Coast in order to deliver 
a paper to a professional association. (Findings of Fact, page 2; 
Discussion and Findings, page 6). 
7. Such presentations were required for advancement at Utah 
State University. (Findings of Fact, page 2; Discussion and 
Findings, page 6) . 
8. Although the convention started on March 28, 1992, Ms. 
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Buczynski arrived several days before the start of her convention 
and stayed in McGaheysville before the beginning of the convention 
with her long-time companion Dianne Valencia. (Findings of Fact, 
page 2). 
9. Ms. Buczynski was injured while staying at McGaheysville. 
(Findings of Fact, page 2). 
10. At the hearing, Ms. Valencia, whose credibility the 
Administrative Law Judge accepted, stated that Ms. Buczynski did 
the following while at McGaheysville: 
a. While flying to Dulles International Airport, Ms. 
Buczynski reviewed journal articles and did other work. (T.R. 120). 
b. Ms. Valencia also testified that Ms. Buczynski spent 
the second day in McGaheysville doing research and working on 
grades. (T.R. 121). 
c. Ms. Valencia further testified that she dropped off 
Ms. Buczynski at the library at James Madison University and that 
"[s]he always did research, and especially before a conference, she 
always did research." (T.R. 121). 
d. Ms.Buczynski also sent faxes to Utah State University 
while in McGaheysville, according to Ms. Valencia. 
e. On the day Ms. Buczynski fell, Ms. Valencia testified 
that "I know [Ms. Buczynski] was getting her grades done; I know 
she was dealing with an issue with the University and Dean Ballam; 
I know she was doing notes and things for her presentation, that 
type of stuff." (T.R. 123). 
11. On page 5 of the Administrative Law Judge's opinion, the 
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testimony of Dr. Bertoch is summarized. Dr. Bertoch is Ms. 
Buczynski's supervisor and head of the psychology department at Utah 
State University. 
In his testimony, Dr. Bertoch acknowledged 
that he had approved and signed the final 
version of the Travel Authorization prior to 
the applicant's departure. He stated that when 
he saw her flight plans, he saw nothing out of 
the ordinary as it was customary for the 
faculty members to leave early to take 
advantage of lower air fares. The University 
encourages this practice, according to Dr. 
Bertoch, when it is practicable for faculty 
member and doesn't cause problems with classes 
being taught. P. 5 of ALJ opinion (emphasis 
added). 
12. This practice was encouraged because the lower air fares 
benefited Utah State University. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, page 5). 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE DECISION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
1. In submitting her preliminary travel authorization form to 
her supervisor, Dean Bertoch, applicant did not disclose that she 
and her companion Dianne Valencia would spend the extra couple days 
in advance of conference, necessitated by the early travel, in 
McGaheysville, Virginia. 
2. On her return from the conference, applicant did not seek 
reimbursement for her lodging expenses in McGaheysville, Virginia. 
3. Applicant testified she went to McGaheysville, adjacent to 
James Madison University, to do additional preparation for the 
presentation of her paper from journals not available at USU. Dr. 
Bertoch testified that if other journals were not available at Utah 
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State University, they were available via the inter-library loan 
system and he, therefore, would not have authorized travel to James 
Madison University for that purpose. 
4. The Administrative Law Judge held the primary purpose for 
the trip to McGaheysville was social and that any benefit conferred 
on Utah State University by research and other work done at James 
Madison University was incidental to the social aspects of the stay 
in McGaheysville. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the facts of this case, whether applicant's trip to 
McGaheysville, Virginia was purely personal is irrelevant. 
Plaintiff is entitled to worker's compensation benefits under the 
"continuous coverage" doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
In denying the applicant benefits under the Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act") , the Administrative Law Judge stated 
that "the accident occurred during a personal diversion a 
substantial distance away from the business destination after the 
applicant had arrived at the destination occasioned by the business 
travel." (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 8) 
(hereafter "Findings") . The Administrative Law Judge further found 
that "[t]he route and time chosen by the applicant were reasonably 
consistent with the purpose up until the time the applicant 
proceeded towards McGaheysville. . ." (Findings, page 9). The 
Administrative Law Judge, and, in turn, the Industrial Commission, 
seem to concede that if the applicant had stayed in a hotel in 
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Baltimore, the continuous coverage rule would have mandated 
compensation, (Findings, page 8). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CONTINUOUS COVERAGE RULE MANDATES COMPENSATION FOR THE 
APPLICANT'S SLIP AND FALL IN McGAHEYSVILLE, VIRGINIA. 
At the hearing the applicant argued that her accident was 
compensable under the "continuous coverage" rule. The basic rule 
is set forth in Larson's Worker's Compensation Desk Edition, Section 
25, designated "Traveling Employees." The rule states that: 
[e]mployees whose work entails travel away 
from the employer's business are held in the 
majority of jurisdictions to be within the 
course of their employment continuously during 
the trip, except when a distinct depart[ure] 
on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries 
arising out of the necessity of sleeping in 
hotels or eating in restaurants away from home 
are usually compensable. Larson, Section 25. 
This rule mandates coverage for accidents which, if they 
occurred at home, would not be compensable. In particular, it 
specifically covers injuries arising out of the necessity of 
sleeping in a hotel while on a business trip. Such injuries as 
slipping in a shower or injuring oneself while grooming are 
examples cited in the above-referenced section in Larson. See 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Orgon, 721 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 
— Austin 1986) and Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 475 So.2d 1288 
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1985). These types of injuries, if they 
occurred at home, would not be compensable even if an employee 
performed work while at home. However, the rule dramatically 
shifts when an employee leaves town on business. When an employee 
is staying at a hotel on a business trip, injuries resulting from 
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"activities reasonably required for personal health or comfort" are 
compensable. Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 475 So.2d 1288, 1290 
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1985). 
Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Industrial 
Commission address whether the specific activity in which Ms. 
Buczynski was engaged was within the purview of the continuous 
coverage rule and subsequent case law, instead the Administrative 
Law Judge and, in turn, the Industrial Commission held that the 
applicant was on a personal errand at the time of her injury and 
therefore all injuries which occurred fell outside the scope of the 
act. The Administrative Law Judge's finding, and, in turn, that of 
the Industrial Commission, are based on a mistaken premises: that 
the stay at McGaheysville and the stay at Baltimore, in this 
instance, constituted two separate and distinct trips under the 
continuous coverage rule. The facts indicate that the applicant's 
trip back East to deliver the paper, whether she slept at 
McGaheysville or Baltimore was one trip, not two, and, in fact, 
occurred at her hotel, which was a necessity required by the trip 
regardless of its location. 
The facts also establish that the applicant arrived several 
days early, as authorized by her employer, because her employer 
testified that he encouraged his traveling employees to go a few 
days early so the low air fare, which was a direct financial 
benefit to the University, could be obtained, with one condition 
which did not apply here: that the teacher's class time not be 
disrupted. Furthermore, the uncontradicted testimony of Dianne 
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Valencia, who the Administrative Law Judge found credible, 
established that Ms. Buczynski had, in fact, performed work for her 
employer while staying in McGaheysville. In fact, the applicant 
worked while flying to Washington, D.C. (Applicant's Statement of 
Facts, 10a.). On the second day of the trip, Ms. Valencia 
testified that the applicant did research and worked on grades. 
(Applicant's Statement of Facts, 10b). On the day of the injury, 
Ms. Valencia testified that "I know she was getting her grades 
done; I know she was dealing with an issue with the University and 
Dean Ballam; I know she was doing notes and things for her 
presentation, that type of stuff." 
Ms. Valencia's testimony directly contradicts paragraph 7 of 
the Administrative Law Judge's findings on page 8 of his decision. 
Ms. Valencia testified that she knew the applicant was doing 
research in preparation for her presentation. Based on the above-
referenced testimony it was error for the Administrative Law Judge 
to characterize the applicant's stay at McGaheysville was social as 
a personal vacation. Nonetheless, even if the purpose of the stay 
in McGaheysville was social, the employee is still entitled to the 
benefit of the continuous coverage rule in this case, very simply 
because her employer, as a direct financial benefit to the 
University, encouraged and requested its employees to travel 
earlier to take advantage of cheaper air fares. By virtue of 
earlier travel, the professor, as a necessity, had to stay 
somewhere as part of her trip, and whether she went to Baltimore 
and sat in a room there for two days or spent them in 
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McGaheysville, where the possibility of some social interaction 
existed, is of no consequence. The "continuous coverage" rule does 
not require a solitary spartan, isolated two-day existence in 
Baltimore for its application. Because the applicant chose to stay 
at an area approximately an hour and one-half to two hours away 
from the site of the actual convention, the Administrative Law 
Judge denied her compensation. This was error not only because 
business was conducted during the McGaheysville stay but also 
because the extended stay took place not only with knowledge but 
the active encouragement of the applicant's employer for the 
financial benefit of the employer. The applicant's employer 
testified that he often encouraged employees to leave a few days 
early. Having encouraged this, the employer has to realize the 
professor must, of necessity, stay somewhere as an intregal part of 
her trip, but now seeks to evade the broad coverage of the Act by 
separating out a portion of the trip which it did not directly, but 
certainly implicitly authorized, and characterize it as entirely 
personal. This is a misapplication of the continuous coverage rule 
in the circumstance where the employer encourages earlier travel to 
obtain the financial benefit of a lower air fare. 
Utah law compels the conclusion that all aspects of her trip 
were business related. In Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agency, Inc., 606 
P. 2d 256, 258 (Utah 1980) the Court noted that "in certain 
occupations there is no reason why some forms of social pleasures 
or diversions cannot be combined with the performance of a duty . 
. . and the presence of such a factor does not necessarily mean 
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that one is not in the course of employment." The Court 
established a test to determine the nature of employee's trip: 
"Whether the paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of the 
trip or other activity is to serve the employer's interest, and the 
social aspects, or other diversions for one's own interest, is 
merely adjunctive thereto." Id. Here the applicant had to present 
a paper. This is a required activity in her line of work. Her 
employer encouraged her to go earlier to reduce the cost of air 
fare. It must then, of necessity, be expressly understood that the 
employee will have to stay in a motel or hotel those extra nights. 
The fact that she visits acquiantances or friends does not 
eliminate the necessity of staying in a motel which in this 
instance was the activity out of which the injury arose. The test 
was later reaffirmed and applied in Ocrden Standard Examiner v. 
Industrial Commission, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983). 
The facts of the Ogden Standard Examiner case are similar to 
Ms. Buczynski's case. There, a newspaper editor from Ogden traveled 
to the Governor's ball in Salt Lake to attend with an owner of his 
paper. Id. at 89. The editor died in an automobile accident on 
the way back to Ogden. His family sought worker's compensation 
benefits. The Court sustained the Industrial Commission's finding 
that the employee was within the scope of employment at the time of 
the auto accident. The employee "intended to discuss editorial 
policy . . . to present his views of his duties . . . and to 
ascertain the scope of his editorial authority . . . " Id. His 
employer, on the other hand, "considered the invitation a social 
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one, and did not intend that the evening would be spent on business 
matters . . ." £d. In fact, business was never discussed at the 
dinner. Nevertheless, the Court found that the auto accident was 
within the course and scope of employment based on the employee's 
subjective motives and purposes in accepting the trip. Here, there 
was no question that the trip was obiectively necessary for the 
applicant's career advancement at Utah State University. Staying 
somewhere overnight was also obi ectively necessary once her 
employer encouraged her to leave a couple days in advance of the 
conference to receive the financial benefit to the University of 
the cheaper air fare. Id at 90. 
In Ms. Buczynski's case there is, however, more to rely on than 
the employer's objective motives and purposes in requiring the trip 
and encouraging the longer stay. Ms, Valencia corroborated the 
fact that the applicant actually worked for her employer during 
their stay at McGaheysville. Ms. Valencia further testified that 
at least some of the work was related to the presentation Ms. 
Buczynski was to deliver in Baltimore. The predominant purpose of 
the entire trip was therefore business, although there were 
certainly personal aspects to the trip. This does not preclude 
compensation under Utah law as long as "the social aspects, or 
other diversion for one's own interest, is merely adjunctive. . ." 
to the business aspect. Ijd. at 90. 
Any personal aspects of the trip to McGaheysville were merely 
adjunctive to Ms. Buczynski's primary purpose and motivation in 
delivering her paper at a professional convention and her employer's 
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objective purpose in having her leave a couple days early. That 
Ms. Valencia testified that Ms. Buczynski performed work relevant 
to her paper at McGaheysville compels this conclusion, as does Utah 
State University's acknowledgement of its objective purpose for an 
early departure. Therefore, under Utah law, whether the trip to 
McGaheysville was purely personal, it was error for the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission to classify 
Ms. Buczynski's stay in McGaheysville as a leisure trip outside the 
"continuous coverage" rule. 
Although Utah has not adopted the continuous coverage rule, it 
is entirely consistent with the line of Utah authority cited above. 
The continuous coverage rule is also the majority rule in the 
United States. The principle behind the rule is sound and should 
be adopted by Utah. The Administrative Law Judge and the 
Industrial Commission did not refuse to apply the rule, but rather 
found that the rule's application in this case would not mandate 
coverage because the applicant hadn't gone to Baltimore or closer 
to Baltimore in selecting her hotel accommodations for the extra 
days of her trip. The applicant submits that this conclusion was 
erroneous based on the discussion above. 
A. MS. BUCZYNSKI WAS NOT ON A PERSONAL ERRAND WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE CONTINUOUS COVERAGE RULE. 
Ms. Buczynski was not on a personal errand within the purview 
of the continuous coverage rule at the time she was injured. For 
purposes of assessing whether an employee was on a personal errand, 
the particular activity the employee was engaged in at the time of 
the injury is determinative. Ms. Buczynski slipped and fell while 
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on her way to the restroom after bathing in a hot-tub. This is not 
a personal errand. The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission exhibited confusion in focusing on the essentially non-
employment activity of bathing in a hot-tub. This focus misses the 
entire purpose and rationale behind the continuous coverage 
doctrine. This doctrine is peculiar in worker's compensation law 
in that it covers reasonable non-employment activity, provided an 
applicant is on a business trip. Bathing in a hot-tub is no more 
a personal errand than taking a shower or combing one's hair. A 
personal errand may arguably be visiting a friend at the friend's 
home or perhaps shopping in a mall. See Marbury v. Industrial 
Commission of Ohio, 577 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio App. 1989)(employee that 
slipped and fell in souvenier shop on out-of-town trip outside 
course of employment.) However, that was not the circumstance here. 
Case law applying the continuous coverage rule is helpful in 
explaining what actions constitute a personal errand. In Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Company v. Orgon, 721 P. 2d 572 (Tex. App. — 
Austin 1986) the court held that a sales manager who cut his hand 
as he was grooming in the morning while out-of-town to attend a 
convention was within the scope of Texas' Worker's Compensation Act. 
This conclusion was based on the continuous coverage rule despite 
the fact that drinking a glass of water does not directly benefit 
an employer. This case embodies the principle that when an 
employee goes out-of-town on business, actions which would not 
normally be compensable, become compensable because of the policies 
underlying the continuous coverage rule and in particular, when 
injury occurs in the hotel which is a necessary part of a business 
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trip. 
In Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 475 So.2d 1288 (Fla. App. 
1 Dist. 1985) the Court found that an employee who was injured 
while exercising while out-of-town on business had not deviated 
from the scope and course of employment. The court found that the 
employee's activities were reasonably required for personal health 
and comfort. Jd. at 1280. As such, in the context of an out-of-
town stay, a normally non-compensable activity was found 
compensable. In a footnote, the court cited approvingly another 
case which explains the rationale for the rule: "although such acts 
are personal to the employee, nevertheless they are expected 
incidents of his away from home employment and indirectly, if not 
directly, benefit the employer; that such acts, therefore, are not 
in fact deviations from the course of employment." 
The applicant asks the Court of Appeals to adopt the 
continuous coverage rule and recognize that its application in the 
instant case, an in-hotel injury, mandates coverage under the Act. 
Although not directly addressed by Utah, the rule is consistent 
with existing Utah case law addressing out-of town trips. Qgden 
Standard Examiner v. Industrial Commission, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1983). 
II. THE DIVERSION LINE OF CASES RELIED ON BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
In denying coverage to Ms. Buczynski, the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission relied on a series of cases 
dealing with diversions from business on trips. There is a section 
in Larson extensively discussing this line of cases also relied on 
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by the Administrative Law Judge. The applicant submits that the 
Industrial Commission's reliance on this line of cases was error, 
because the trip to McGaheysville was not in fact a diversion at 
all, but rather an inextricable and integral part of one business 
trip. The application of the diversion line of cases presupposes 
a diversion has even taken place. The undisputed facts of this 
case suggest that no such diversion can be found in Ms. Buczynski's 
case. 
Ms. Buczynski's trip was preapproved and preauthorized for a 
length of time beyond the actual dates of her convention. Dr. 
Bertoch, her employer, testified that this practice is encouraged 
so the University receives the benefit of cheaper air fare. At the 
time of her injury, the applicant was in her hotel. She was not at 
a friend's house, a night club or socializing with acquiantances, 
but instead at her hotel which was a necessary component of her 
travel; and frankly, one is entitled to sit in a hot-tub in her own 
hotel without slipping outside the scope of the continuous coverage 
rule. 
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission rely on a case from Virginia considering a closely 
analogous fact pattern. Nevertheless, key facts are present in Ms. 
Buczynski's case that were not present in the Virginia case, and 
therefore, a different conclusion is warranted. 
In Virginia Polytechnic Institute v. Wood, 360 S.E.2d 376 (Va. 
App. 1987) a graduate student traveled to Las Vegas to deliver a 
presentation. She was injured while riding her bike to a camp site 
outside of Las Vegas. She flew to Las Vegas one day before the 
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rest of the faculty and several days before the conference began. 
Id. at 377. Unlike Ms. Buczynski, the student in Wood was not 
given permission to leave early or encouraged to leave early on her 
trip. Neither was it established that her early departure 
benefited the University. Dr. Bertoch testified that he encouraged 
early departures from faculty members going on trips to deliver 
papers. Therefore, Ms. Buczynski's situation is clearly 
distinguishable from the student in Wood. 
In the alternative, the applicant submits that the Wood case 
should not be followed in Utah. It does not reflect the well-
settled Utah policy that the Worker's Compensation Act be liberally 
construed to afford coverage to injured employees. Instead the 
Wood case seeks out artificial distinctions in an attempt to deny 
coverage. For instance, the court summarily concludes that 
"[a]uthorized attendance at the conference and preparing for the 
conference are separate and distinct activities." No case law was 
cited for this proposition and no argument was proffered in support 
of this counter-intuitive assertion. 
The applicant therefore asks the Court of Appeals not to 
follow the Wood case. The case is inconsistent with the 
fundamental premise of Utah law that the Act be interpreted in a 
liberal manner to afford coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicant asks the Court of Appeals to instead follow the 
continuous coverage rule in this instance. It is the rule most 
applicable to Ms. Buczynski's case and is widely accepted in the 
United States. Its application mandates coverage for Ms. 
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Buczynski. The applicant's stay at McGaheysville and her stay at 
Baltimore are properly considered one inextricably intertwined 
business trip. The distinction relied on by the Administrative Law 
Judge and Industrial Commission to distinguish the two segments of 
Ms. Buczynski's trip are contrary to the facts of the case and do 
not interpret them in a liberal and beneficient manner. The 
applicant therefore asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the 
Industrial Commission. 
Dated this ^ J day of ^ ^ ^ K ^ ^ ^ f , 1996, 
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September, 1996, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to: 
Suzan Pixton 
Workers Compensation Fund 
392 East 6400 South 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0929 
Alan Hennebold 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Elliot K. Morris #2319 
Attorney for Defendants 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 288-8190 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93-696 
PATRICIA BUCZYNSKI, 
Applicant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 19, 
1993 at 1:00 o'clock p.m., the same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Patrick Holden, Attorney at 
Law. 
The defendants, Utah State University and/or Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah, were represented by Elliot K. Morris, Attorney at Law. 
At the commencement of the hearing, applicant's counsel submitted a Hearing Memorandum 
setting forth case law and argument based thereon which in the belief of counsel supports the 
applicant's claim for workers compensation benefits under U.C. A. 35-1-45. Counsel for Defendants 
did not submit a formal memorandum, but did provide the Administrative Law Judge with copies 
of cases and citations counsel felt are supportive of defendants' position. The medical exhibits were 
then stipulated to by the parties and admitted into evidence. Counsel for the defendants indicated 
that an independent medical exam had recently been performed by Dr. David McCann and that the 
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* 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
report was not yet completed. Counsel asked that the record remain open for the submission of this 
report. There being no objection thereto, the motion was granted. 
After receiving the memorandum and citations, and opening statements from each side, a 
lengthy hearing ensued which elicited the testimony of the applicant and a number of other witnesses, 
and resulted in the admission of a large amount of documentary evidence. Several photographs and 
video tapes were also admitted into evidence. Having reviewed the Memorandum of Law, heard and 
observed the testimony of the witnesses, examined the documentary evidence, the photographs and 
video tapes, and being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to 
enter the following, 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Applicant claims she was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of her 
employment with Utah State University (USU) on March 26,1992 while in McGaheysville Virginia. 
She also claims that she was further injured on December 21, 1992 in another accident arising out 
of and in the course of her employment with USU when she was in the reception area of the 
psychology department offices at USU in Logan, Utah. Defendants have answered these claims by 
denying that the March 26, 1992 incident and its resultant injuries arose out of and in the course of 
applicant's employment with USU, and by denying that the December 21, 1992 incident ever 
occurred, or if it did, that it, and the previous accident, did not result in the disability claimed by 
the applicant. 
A. Incident of March 26, 1992 
The applicant herein, Patricia Buczynski, was employed by Utah State University as an 
Assistant Professor of Psychology in the College of Education beginning January 1, 1991. On 
March 24, 1992, she, with her live-in companion, Diane Valencia, flew from Salt Lake City to 
Dulles International Airport, outside of Washington D.C. The applicant was scheduled to attend, 
and present a paper at the annual convention of the American Association for Counseling and 
Development (hereafter AACD) which was being held in Baltimore, Maryland from March 27th 
through the 30th, 1992. Her participation in the convention had been approved by her department 
head at USU pursuant the College's policy of encouraging, if not requiring, two scholarly 
presentations per year for each faculty member. Consequently, USU officials pre-approved payment 
of the applicant's travel expenses subject to the University's reimbursement policies and procedures. 
After arriving at Dulles, the applicant and her companion rented a car and proceeded to drive 
to the town of McGaheysville, Virginia, some 100 miles (as the crow flies) southwest of Washington 
D .C , and approximately 150 miles southwest of Baltimore, the site of the conference (Exhibit D-
16). Upon arriving at McGaheysville, applicant and companion checked into a room at the 
Massanutten Hotel, which room they had reserved some months earlier. 
On the evening of Thursday, March 26th, the applicant and her companion were relaxing in 
the hot tub at the hotel. The tub was situated near the swimming pool. At approximately 8:00 p.m. 
applicant exited the hot tub intending to go to the women's rest room and lockers. As she was 
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walking past the swimming pool she slipped and fell in a puddle of water apparently created by the 
wash-over of the pool. As a result of this fall, the applicant was taken by squad car to Rockingham 
Memorial Hospital in Harrisonburg, Virginia where she was treated in the emergency room for 
complaints associated with her right knee. She was discharged with a diagnosis of knee strain and 
"possible quadriceps tear." 
The following day, Friday, March 27th, applicant and her friend checked out of their hotel 
in McGaheysville and drove to Baltimore where they checked into a room at the Radisson Hotel, 
which room they had also reserved some months earlier. The following day, the applicant attended 
the convention and presented her paper. On Sunday, the applicant attended additional sessions of 
the convention, and on Monday, March 30th drove with her companion to Dulles International where 
they returned the rental car to the agency, and boarded their previously scheduled return flight to Salt 
Lake City. 
The forgoing facts are uncontroverted. Important additional facts regarding the reasons for 
applicant's excursion to Virginia and her activities while there, along with those surrounding the 
claimed accident of December 21, 1992 are in dispute, and therefore must be found by weighing the 
evidence tending to support or controvert the version of these facts propounded by each side. 
1. Summary of testimony 
Applicant testified that her purpose in going to McGaheysville two and one half days prior 
to the AACD convention in Baltimore was so that she could go to James Madison University (JMU) 
to do some last minute research and preparation for her presentation at the AACD convention. 
(After discussions regarding various maps of the area, the parties agreed that JMU is located in 
Harrisonburg, Virginia approximately 15 miles from McGaheysville; see Exhibit D-16). 
On direct examination, the applicant produced a document which she identified as an itinerary 
of her activities while on her trip to McGaheysville and Baltimore (Exhibit A-8). She testified that 
she prepared this document some months after the trip at the request of the defendants' claims 
adjuster who was apparently assigned to investigate the facts regarding the workers compensation 
claim which the applicant had filed some weeks after returning from the trip. This itinerary indicates 
that while in Virginia, with the exception of meals, the applicant spent the entire time prior to her 
injury, engaged in research at JMU, or preparing final grades for classes she had taught die previous 
semester. Applicant went on to relate the circumstances surrounding her accident and the injuries 
she has allegedly suffered as a result. 
On cross examination, Applicant acknowledged that she had lived with her companion in 
McGaheysville for a little over two years prior to moving to Logan to fill her position with Utah 
State University. She also acknowledged that she had been an assistant professor at JMU during the 
time she lived in McGaheysville. In spite of these admissions, however, the applicant denied having 
spent any time doing such things as sight seeing, visiting friends, etc. while in Virginia. She 
affirmed that exhibit A-8 was a true and correct summary of her activities during the trip. 
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During direct examination of the applicant, a series of documents had been entered into 
evidence as Exhibit A-21. These were identified by the applicant and other witnesses as 
documentation submitted to, or prepared by, USU both prior to, and after applicant's trip pursuant 
to USU business travel policy and procedure. On cross examination applicant admitted that she had 
prepared the preliminary travel authorization (TA) form and identified her handwriting on page 9 of 
Exhibit A-21. Section 2 of that form asks for destination, departure and return dates, purpose of 
trip, and others in party. Applicant wrote: "Baltimore, MD. USA. March 24, March 29. Deliver 
Paper (Presentation) (Flying in to Washington D.C.)." Applicant further admitted that she had 
known of her trip to Baltimore for several months prior to her departure; that she and Ms. Valenia 
had decided to go to McGaheysville and had made reservations at the Massanutten Hotel; that in 
spite of this knowledge, she had not indicated these intentions on her TA form. 
Exhibit A-21 also manifests that upon returning to Logan, no receipts for actual expenses 
were given by the applicant to her employer that identified where the applicant had been during the 
trip, other than Dulles International Airport, and Baltimore. The second page (not numbered) of 
Exhibit A-21 appears to be a piece of notebook paper with the words HTA For AACD - Baltimore 
March '92M hand written at the top. Ms. Valencia later identified this writing and that immediately 
below it as her own. Karen Ranson, secretary to Dr. Michael Bertoch, applicant's department head 
at USU, later testified that the remainder of the writing on this page is hers. Ms. Valencia testified 
that she had prepared this document as a summary and tally of the receipts she had kept for the 
applicant from their trip. The applicant then apparently submitted the receipts along with this 
summary to Ms. Ranson who prepared the reconciliation of the pre-trip authorization, with the post 
trip documentation of actual expenditures (Exhibit A-21, documents entitled "Utah State University, 
Travel Authorization*1). There are no receipts for the lodging at the Massanutten Hotel. One 
receipt, apparently for a meal, has the words "Massanutten Athleats" printed on it. But nowhere 
does it state the location of the establishment. In short, as Ms. Ranson later testified, nothing in the 
documentation submitted by the applicant before or after the trip would have put her employer on 
notice of her intent to travel to McGaheysville, nor have given them an opportunity to approve of 
that excursion or sanction her activities during it as work related. When questioned as to why there 
were no recipts for lodging or meals that would have indicated her presence in McGaheysville, 
applicant offered no explanation. 
The applicant admitted on cross examination that she and Ms. Valencia benefited financially 
from the early departure flight arrangements as the cost of Ms. Valencia's plane ticket was lower 
than if they had flown directly to Baltimore the day before the convention. Applicant also 
acknowledged the discount on their lodging at the Massanutten Hotel they received because of their 
acquaintence with people who worked at the hotel. 
Applicant's version of the trip's itinerary was challenged in the testimony of Diane Valencia, 
who was called as a witness for the applicant. Ms. Valencia affirmed that she was the applicant's 
companion who accompanied her to Virginia and Baltimore. Ms. Valencia testified that she had 
lived with the applicant continuously during the time the applicant lived and worked in the 
McGaheysville - Harrisonburg area and that she had moved to Logan with the applicant and had 
there continued to live with her up until the late Spring of 1993. Ms. Valencia further testified that 
the Massanutten Hotel was located in the very area or Hresort" community where she and the 
applicant had previously lived. She indicated that they had friends and acquaintances in the area, 
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and had in fact been given a special rate on their lodging at the hotel because of their connections 
there. When shown exhibit A-8 on cross examination, Ms. Valencia testified that she did not agree 
with the outline of events depicted thereon. Ms. Valencia clearly asserted in her testimony that while 
in McGaheysville, she and the applicant had among other things, visited a stoneware shop and a 
winery, and had visited with friends in the area. She indicated that during the stay at McGaheysville 
she did drive the applicant to JMU and left her there for a couple of hours a couple of times, but she 
had no knowledge of what applicant did while she was there. Ms. Valencia also testified that the 
applicant did prepare final grades and fax these to her office at USU while they were at 
McGaheysville. Ms. Valencia confirmed that reservations for lodging during the trip had been made 
some months prior to their departure. Ms. Valencia further testified that she would not have gone 
on the trip, but for the reduced airfare, the excursion to McGaheysville, and the applicant's pleading 
for Ms. Valencia to accompany her. Additional aspects of this witnesses's testimony will be related 
and discussed hereafter. 
Applicant maintained both in her testimony, and in argument, that her department head, Dr. 
Bertoch and his secretary could plainly see that she was flying to Washington D.C. and not 
Baltimore, and that her flight plans disclosed that she would arrive in the area several days prior to 
the convention, and that therefore they had notice of the fact that she would be engaged in activities 
in addition to, and other than, attending the convention. In his testimony, Dr. Bertoch acknowledged 
that he had approved and signed the final version of the TA prior to applicant's departure. He stated 
that when he saw her flight plans, he saw nothing out of the ordinary as it was customary for faculty 
members to leave early to take advantage of lower air fares. The University encourages this 
practice, according to Dr. Bertoch, when it is practicable for the faculty member and doesn't cause 
problems with classes being taught. 
Dr. Bertoch also testified that professors are not on a strict time clock; that they are free to 
come and go as they please so long as they meet their teaching obligations. Dr. Bertoch testified 
that if a professor wanted to take a couple of days for a personal vacation, she would not normally 
report such to the department, unless she was going to be unable to teach a scheduled class. Both 
applicant and Dr. Bertoch verified in their testimony, that the timing of applicant's trip to Virginia 
and Baltimore coincided with the break between semesters and that therefore the applicant had no 
teaching obligations at the time. Thus, it is reasonable to infer from this testimony was that the week 
of March 24 - 30, 1992 was a time when the applicant could take a personal vacation without having 
to notify her department of her intent to do so, or of her whereabouts. 
With respect to the travel authorization, Dr. Bertoch testified that when he saw that the 
applicant was flying into Washington, D.C. he was under the impression that the applicant was going 
to be seeking research grants in the nation's capital, an activity for which he would have given his 
approval. Dr. Bertoch also indicated that he approves of social activities associated with academic 
conventions where professors can mingle with other experts in their fields and forge relationships 
that advance the interests of the University. He stated that had the applicant gone to Baltimore early 
so as to engage in this type of activity, he would have had no problem approving travel plans to 
accommodate such activities. 
During her testimony applicant had indicated that she went to JMU in order to avail herself 
of scholarly and professional journals not available at the USU library. But, when questioned if he 
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would have approved a trip to Virginia for the purpose of allowing the applicant to do research at 
the JMU library, Dr. Bertoch stated that he would not have approved such a trip. His testimony was 
to the effect that library research was an activity that professors could accomplish on campus; that 
if certain journals were not available in the USU library, they were readily accessible through an 
inter-library loan system. 
Dr. Bertoch also refuted the applicant's claim that she was in need of this research in order 
to prepare for her presentation. While conceding that additional reading on the subject of one's 
paper prior to presentation would be beneficial to the professor and thus derivatively, the University, 
Dr. Bertoch also stated that it would be highly improbable, and not within the usual practice of the 
academic community, for a professor to be doing last minute touch up on a paper that had already 
been accepted in its final version by the AACD some months prior to the convention. 
2. Discussion & Findings 
The applicant, Ms. Valencia and Dr. Bertoch all verified in their testimony that scholarly 
research is a way of life for the college professor in general, and specifically, the applicant. 
Documents admitted into evidence along with Dr. Bertoch's testimony acknowledge that 
approximately 45% of the applicant's efforts as a professor were to be devoted to research and 
writing (see Exhibit D-8). The applicant and Ms. Valencia testified that the applicant maintained a 
home office where applicant spent a large amount of time engaged in her academic pursuits. 
The administrative law judge takes judicial notice of the "publish or perish " life of a college 
professor and that institutions of higher learning derive benefits in terms of prestige and funding from 
the research and writing accomplished by their faculties. However, it is also equally well known that 
one of the non-monetary rewards of the academic life is the great latitude and freedom to do one's 
work when one pleases as compared to other jobs in our society. Finally, it is also equally within 
the realm of judicial notice, that great benefits inure to the academicians themselves from successful 
research and publication and that for many, these activities are as much personal avocations as they 
are employment related. Hence, the research activities of a college professor confer a benefit which 
is shared by the professor and the institution to which she may be associated. 
Ms. Valencia's testimony underscores the greater degree of personal benefit and motivation 
in a college professor's research activity, than the job required activities of most other types of 
employment. When asked if the applicant continued to do research after her injuries, Ms. Valencia 
indicated that she observed that the applicant had so continued. This would have also been after the 
time when the applicant was notified that her contract would not be renewed with USU, which 
occurred in August of 1992, (see Exhibit D-14) some five months after her first accident, but four 
months before the claimed second accident. Thus it would appear that the applicant continued to 
work on her research projects even after knowing that these efforts were no longer required to 
maintain her in good standing with her employer. 
Based on the forgoing, the administrative law judge finds that the applicant was not required 
or directed by her employer to go to James Madison University prior to her attending the AACD 
convention in Baltimore. Any benefit conferred on USU by research done by the applicant at JMU 
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is coincidental and no greater than similar activities of the applicant in her own home, where 
presumably, if an injury occurred, it would be unreasonable to afford workers compensation 
coverage. If the applicant chose to do her research and writing on her employer's premises, 
conceivably coverage would have been afforded for an injury occurring during that activity, 
however, since her employer did not require her to do her research off campus or sanction her 
alleged work at JMU, her election to do so, coupled with the high degree of personal benefit derived 
from the activity, makes it a personal activity. 
On the sole basis of the above, the administrative law judge would find that applicant's 
excursion to, and stay at McGaheysville was personal in its motivation and purpose from start to 
finish, and that any work activities engaged in during this diversion were merely "incidental and 
adjunctive" thereto. (See Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agcv.. Inc.. 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980) at p. 258). 
However, this finding also rests on a number of other facts and additional evidence: 
1. It is uncontroverted that applicant and her companion had previously lived in this 
area; had friends there; were familiar with the accommodations, and received a lodging 
discount because of their acquaintances. 
2. The excursion had been planned for months. 
3. Applicant and Ms. Valencia also benefited financially from the flight arrangements 
as the cost of Ms. Valencia's plane ticket was lower than if they had flown directly to 
Baltimore the day before the convention. It appears that Ms. Valencia would not have gone 
on the trip, but for the reduced airfare, the excursion to McGaheysville, and the applicant's 
pleading for Ms. Valencia to accompany her. 
4. Applicant's conduct before and immediately after the trip evidence her own belief that 
she was not on University business at the time. Though the stay at McGaheysville had been 
planned for months, applicant did not apprise her employer of her intended trip to 
McGaheysville when she submitted her TA form. Nor did she submit any expense receipts 
or vouchers after the trip which would indicate that she had been anywhere other than the 
Washington D.C./Baltimore area. Exhibit A-21 clearly infers and I therefore find that the 
applicant never requested nor received reimbursement for her lodging expenses at 
McGaheysville. 
5. At no time during this diversion did the applicant engage in grant seeking activities 
or professional associations which would have gained the sanction of the applicant's 
department head as work related activities adjunctive to the AACD convention. Applicant's 
own testimony fails to show any such activities, the only association, according to the 
applicant, being that of her companion, Ms. Valencia. 
6. Having observed and heard the witnesses, I find that the applicant's testimony is not 
believable (see "Applicant's Credibility" below for a more detailed discussion of the basis 
for this finding). Therefore, the only reliable account of the activities of applicant's trip of 
March 24 - March 30, 1992 is that of Ms. Valencia. Therefore, I find that the applicant's 
activities during the excursion to the McGaheysville/Harrisonburg area were as stated by Ms. 
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Valencia, namely, visits to friends, merchants, local sightseeing attractions, and JMU, along 
with meals, hot tub relaxation, and preparing final grades. 
7. Finally, what the applicant actually did at JMU is uncertain and unproved. There is 
no credible evidence to support a finding that the applicant in fact did research at JMU as 
she maintains. Ms. Valencia could only state that the applicant went to JMU a couple of 
times while they were in the area. As she did not accompany her, Ms. Valencia could not 
testify as to what the applicant did while at the school. A host of other activities could be 
imagined which would plausibly explain applicant's visits to JMU, such as visiting friends 
and acquaintances on the JMU faculty. 
The finding that the applicant was not directed to go to Harrisonburg and JMU by her 
employer takes this case out of the continuous coverage rule referenced in applicant's hearing 
memorandum. Applicant cites the case of Carpizzi v. Southern District Reporters. 471 N.Y.S. 2d. 
554 (New York 1984) in support of the application of this rule. Yet, the language of the New York 
Court of Appeals in Carpizzi illustrates why the applicant cannot be afforded coverage under the 
continuous coverage rule: 
Thus if an employee is directed as part of his duties, to remain in a 
particular place or locality for a specified length of time the rule 
applied is simply that the employee is not expected to wait immobile, 
but may indulge in any reasonable activity at that place, and if he 
does so the risk inherent in such activity is an incident of his 
employment. 
At page 555 (emphasis added). Applicant did not remain in the place or locale to which she was 
required to go as a result the AACD convention. She drove 150 miles away from it to a place she 
was not directed or required to go by her employer and there stayed at a resort hotel for three 
nights. And, as the evidence shows, applicant did not just drive to McGaheysville on a lark to kill 
time prior to the convention. The excursion had been planned for some months. 
The cases of Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Commission (Cheney). 663 P.2d 88 
(Utah 1983) and Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agcy. Inc. as cited and argued by the applicant, do not 
directly apply to the facts of this type of case. Both Ogden Standard Examiner and Martinson deal 
with accidents occurring during the trip home. To determine coverage in those cases it was 
necessary to decide if the activity for which the travel was required was predominantly business or 
pleasure. In the case at hand, the accident occurred during a personal diversion a substantial distance 
away from the business destination after the applicant had arrived at the destination occasioned by 
the business travel. The accident did not occur during the travel to or from that destination. The 
personal diversion from the business trip in terms of both time and space is clearly identifiable. The 
rules set forth in Martinson could be applicable to either the business portion of applicant's trip or 
the diversion if each are looked at separately, as they must be in these types of situations. (See 
Larson's, section 19.31 "Going away from business destination"). 
It is reasonable to find that the applicant was in the course of her employment from the time 
of her departure from Logan on March 24th up to her arrival at Dulles International since Utah State 
8 
University specifically required and paid for the applicant's attendance at the AACD convention. 
The route and time chosen by the applicant were reasonably consistent with this purpose, up until 
the time the applicant proceeded towards McGaheysville, a destination opposite in direction from 
Baltimore. Arthur Larson's treatise on the Law of Workers Compensation is replete with references 
to cases involving accidents occurring during a personal deviation from a work related trip. (See 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Desk Edition, Section 19, p. 4-107 et seq.; See for example: 
Virginia Polvtechnic Inst, v. Wood, 360 S.E. 2d 376 (Virginia 1987). These cases underscore the 
fact that it is not unusual for an employee to take advantage of a business trip for the purpose of 
pursuing some personal diversion while in the locale or area to which they have travelled for their 
employer. It is the rule of these cases that injuries arising out of and in the course of a personal 
diversion are not compensable under workers compensation laws, if the diversion is clearly 
identifiable and substantial. The public policy behind this rule is simply that it would be 
unreasonable to charge an employer for an employee's decision to take a personal vacation or 
diversion after arriving in the vicinity occasioned by the business trip. Professor Larson states: 
An identifiable deviation from a business trip for personal reasons 
takes the employee out of the course of his employment until he 
returns to the route of the business trip, unless the deviation is so 
small as to be disregarded as insubstantial. 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation. Desk Edition. Section 19. Applying the principles of the 
Martinson case to applicant's excursion to McGaheysville results in a finding that the applicant was 
on a personal vacation and engaged in a personal activity at the time of her injury. I find that that 
diversion is identifiable and constitutes, as has been characterized in Larson's treatise, a substantial 
"deviation from a business trip for personal reasons/ The applicant has failed to meet her burden 
of proof to show that she was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment 
on March 26, 1992. 
B. Incident of December 21, 1992 
Applicant testified that at approximately 2:00 pm on December 21, 1992 she was standing 
in the reception area of the psychology department offices at Utah State University. She was 
supporting herself with the crutches she had been using since the March 26, 1992 injury to her right 
knee. She also had her right hand on the door knob of the glass panelled door through which the 
reception area was entered from the hallway outside. The door was somewhat opened, perhaps as 
much as 18 inches. At that moment, Dr. Bertoch entered the reception area by pulling on the door 
knob on the outside face of the door and jerking the door away from the applicant. According the 
applicant, this caused her to loose her balance and resulted in her stumbling and catching herself with 
her crutches, and by throwing her weight onto her left leg. The outcome of this alleged incident 
was, according to the applicant, exacerbation of neck pain which the applicant said she had been 
experiencing since the March 26, 1992 accident, pain in her left knee, bruises under her arms, and 
increased pain and swelling in the right knee. 
Photographs and video footage of the door in question were admitted into evidence. The 
door is essentially a glass panel with about a nine inch white wood or metal border around the 
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perimeter. The glass is clear and easily seen through. One approaching the door from either side 
could not help but see someone standing on the other side, unless they were not looking towards the 
door. Seemingly, one would at least look at the door in order to grasp the handle or knob, and thus 
would see someone standing on the other side. 
Dr. Bertoch testified that he remembered the day in question because he had given the office 
staff, including the receptionists, an extra long lunch hour so that they could have a special 
Christmas luncheon. While they were gone to lunch, he had sat in the reception area to take calls 
and greet those coming into the offices. The staff returned a little before 2:00 p.m. 
On direct examination, Dr. Bertoch was asked if, on the day in question he had entered the 
reception area through the door in question and had caused the incident described by the applicant. 
He denied that such an incident occurred. When asked if it could have occurred on another day and 
that perhaps the applicant was simply confused as to the dates, Dr. Bertoch stated that such an 
incident never occurred; that he had never opened the door to the reception area to find the applicant 
immediately on the other side, supported by her crutches. 
Applicant testified that at the time of this alleged incident, she was speaking with Karen 
Ranson who was at the reception desk. In her testimony, Ms. Ranson denied that the incident 
described by the applicant had ever occurred. She also stated that she did not recollect speaking to 
the applicant at all on the day in question. She stated that she remembered the day because of the 
extra long lunch break Dr. Bertoch had given to the staff. 
As set forth above and below, numerous pieces of evidence and contradictory testimony 
impeach the applicant's credibility. On the other hand, the credibility of Dr. Bertoch and Ms. 
Ranson, along with that of the other witnesses against the applicant's position is unassailed. Having 
viewed the demeanor of all the witnesses, the administrative law judge finds Dr. Bertoch's and Ms. 
Ranson's version of the facts surrounding the alleged incident of December 21, 1992 to be more 
believable than the applicant's. I therefore find that the incident in question, did not occur. 
Applicants history of passing out while intoxicated, as noted in following paragraphs, 
suggests numerous possible explanations for the complaints the applicant reported to her doctors later 
in December of 1992. Some of these complaints are in reality no different than those mentioned in 
the medical record prior to the alleged incident of December 21st. No sufficient evidence existing 
to prove a causal connection between applicant's employment and the medical conditions she 
allegedly suffers from, I further find that the applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof to show 
that she was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Utah State 
University on December 21, 1992 or any other day during her employment with the University. 
C. Applicant's credibility 
Some instances of controverted testimony have already been mentioned. The record contains 
many more examples of inconsistency and dubious behavior on the part of the applicant. The 
following are some cogent highlights. 
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Shortly after the incident at McGaheysville the applicant apparently began complaining of 
headaches. However, such are not stated in the medical record until nearly two and one half months 
post incident. Applicant saw at least four physicians immediately upon her return from Baltimore, 
none of whom mentioned anything about a head injury. Neck pain is first mentioned nearly a month 
later in one of Dr. Carlson's notes. He indicates that the applicant thought then that her neck was 
aching because of having to use crutches and lift her leg by herself. It is not until the applicant saw 
Dr. Reichert on June 6, 1992 that any mention of a blow to the head and neck in the March 26th 
incident is made. 
Dr. Reichert notes on 6-9-92 that the applicant "denies other head, neck or back injuries.H 
This information given to Dr. Reichert is inconsistent with the fact that the applicant had previously 
injured her upper back and neck while employed by JMU. The applicant received several months 
of treatment for thoracic and cervical strain in the Summer and Fall of 1989. (See Defendants 
Exhibit pp. 124-125). At that time she disclosed an old AC joint separation to her treating physician 
which was not mentioned to her doctors after the March 26th incident. 
Dr. Reichert notes on 6-9-92 that the applicant "denies seizures, dizzy spells, loss of 
consciousness, loss of vision or double vision...H On October 23,1992, the applicant saw Dr. Glenn 
T. Goodwin for a Neuropsychological consultation. According to Dr. Goodwin's report, the 
applicant told him that within 48 hours of her March 26, 1992 accident, she was experiencing 
"nausea and vomiting, dizziness..." (Exhibit D-l , p. 105). 
Dr. Goodwin also noted that at the time of his examination of the applicant she was 
complaining of "not being able to think quickly or clearly. She complains of difficulty concentrating. 
She states that it takes more effort now to concentrate. She complains of problems planning ahead 
and prioritizing her activities...She has noticed problems organizing her lectures. She states that she 
cannot figure our what to do in advance, especially in situations requiring problem solving. She also 
reports problems with both expressive and receptive speech. During conversation she often forgets 
the subject and has to ask people to repeat themselves..." The picture portrayed is of a woman 
having great difficulty communicating with others and performing the basic functions required of a 
university professor. 
Having observed the applicant during her testimony which lasted several hours, and during 
the entirety of the hearing which lasted nearly 14 hours, the administrative law judge could see no 
evidence of the problems applicant has complained of to Dr. Reichert, Dr. Goodwin, Dr. Gummow, 
and Dr. France. She was lucid and articulate in her testimony, had no apparent difficulty with her 
memory, and was quick to attempt to explain away the inconsistencies between her testimony and 
the other evidence. I saw nothing that would indicate any of the impairments of memory, thought 
and speech related by the applicant to her physicians. Nor did I see evidence of the bladder 
incontinence or urgency applicant complained of to Dr. France on October 11, 1993 (eight days 
before the hearing). At that time Dr. France noted that the applicant required frequent breaks during 
his two and one half interview with her in order to "go to the bathroom." Such was definitely not 
the case during this 14 hour hearing. Applicant took the same breaks as everyone else, which were 
often several hours apart. 
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In further contrast to Dr. Goodwin's notes is the fact that, on cross examination the applicant 
admitted to having flown to Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania on October 15, 1992 where she was the guest 
of Bloomsburg University at a series of interviews lasting the entire day; the result being that the 
applicant was offered an administrative post with the University at a higher salary than the one she 
was earning with USU. During this line of questioning, counsel for defendants produced a series 
of documents from Bloomsburg University (Exhibit D-16) confirming applicant's visit and the fact 
that she had successfully passed the screening of that University's search committee and after the 
interviews, had been offered the job. 
It is inconceivable to this administrative law judge that the applicant could in actuality be 
suffering from the complaints communicated to Dr. Goodwin on 10-23-92 when only a week earlier 
she had performed so well in series of interviews lasting an entire day that she had been offered a 
very responsible position at Bloomsburg University. All this after having flown across country by 
herself. This is not consistent with the disabilities alleged by the applicant to her physicians through 
out the course of her treatment. It is consistent, however, with the fact that an MRI scan and EEG 
test found no evidence of organic brain injury or a blow to the head after her March 26, 1992 injury 
and with the fact that there are numerous references in the medical records to suspicions by 
applicant's medical providers of "functional overlay" and "symptom embellishment." 
The activity of the applicant in pursuing this job in Pennsylvania is evidence that her 
"symptom embellishment" is a willful and intentional misrepresentation of her abilities. This is 
borne out by a plethora of additional evidence, which for the sake of brevity, I shall only summarize 
as follows: 
1. The applicant's own testimony, supported by student evaluation 
documents from USU, that she had performed very well in the class 
room in the Fall semester of 1992 (see Exhibits A-22 & A-23). 
2. Ms. Valencia's testimony that the applicant turned down the job offer 
in Pennsylvania because Ms. Valencia had expressed her intention of 
remaining in Utah if the applicant moved. This, as opposed to 
applicant's assertion that she was not able to take the job due to her 
injury. 
3. The testimony of the applicant's neighbors, Debbie & Mike Kellog, 
and Anita Buck. These witnesses spoke to numerous instances of the 
applicant doing yard work, lounging around the house, etc. where she 
did not use her knee brace, or neck collar. Yet, at the hearing the 
applicant was wearing a large, rigid knee brace and a cervical collar. 
These witnesses said they observed no guarding of the neck for pain 
when the applicant turned to look to either side. An affidavit from 
another neighbor, although heresay, corroborates these observations 
(see Exhibit D-15). 
4. Video tape footage showing the applicant walking, driving, and 
exercising. A knee brace is seen in most of the footage, however, 
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these tapes are revealing in that they disclose the applicant 
competently performing activities of every day life. Of particular 
note is footage of the applicant's participation in a political 
demonstration and rally in Logan in April of this year. Her 
participation in this event with its attendant confrontation, is an 
additional piece of evidence that the applicant can function at a level 
inconsistent with that portrayed to her health care providers. 
5. On cross examination, in response to counsel's question as to the 
general state of her health on or about the first week of July, 1992, 
some three months post injury, the applicant testified that it was poor. 
Counsel then showed her a document (Exhibit D-5) which applicant 
identified as a life insurance application which she filled out and 
signed on July 6,1992 for the purpose of increasing her life insurance 
coverage under the plan offered by USU. While acknowledging a 
medical history for her back and knee on the form, the applicant, in 
response to question 9 on the form, indicated that she was in good 
health. Nowhere did she disclose or admit to the symptoms she had 
complained of to Dr. Reichert a month earlier. Finally, in response 
to question 1, she denied the use of alcoholic beverages at the time. 
When questioned on this, applicant said she was abstaining at the time 
she filled out the form. (This assertion was later rebutted by the 
testimony of Anita Buck who related an instance in July of 1992 
where she observed the applicant in an intoxicated condition). 
Also telling is the virtual sterilization of the applicant's medical history of any reference to 
what appears to be applicant's long standing problem with alcohol consumption. Nowhere in the 
medical records does the applicant admit or suggest to her providers that she was a heavy drinker 
and had been intoxicated on numerous occasions, both before and after her alleged accidents. The 
belated augmentation of Dr. Linda Gummow's medical record by the applicant at the time of hearing 
misses the point. While Dr. Gummow may be correct in her 10-18-93 letter to applicant's counsel 
regarding the relationship of alcohol to neuropsychological impairment, the issue here is credibility 
and applicant's willful withholding of important information from her health care providers. And 
it is not just the drinking itself that applicant failed to disclose, but significant sequelae, as well. 
Ms. Valencia testified that the applicant had a significant drinking problem for years prior 
to the incident of March 26, 1992. Ms. Buck and Ms. Kellog related several instances of seeing the 
applicant "passed out" in an inebriated state. Of particular significance was Ms. Valencia's account 
of a party she and the applicant attended about a week prior to a neuropsychological evaluation which 
had been scheduled with Dr. Gummow in February of 1993. At that party, according to Ms. 
Valencia's testimony, the applicant became drunk and fell in a bathroom severely cutting her head. 
When the others at the party attempted to call for medical assistance, the applicant became agitated 
and demanded that no medical help be requested. The reason given by the applicant to those 
attending her was that Hit will hurt my law suit." 
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Ms. Valencia's account of this incident was corroborated by testimony of the applicant's 
neighbors, Mike and Debbie Kellog. They each testified that they had been asked by Ms. Valencia 
to come over to the applicant's house to look at a gash in the applicant's head which they had been 
informed the applicant had received the previous night at a party. They testified that they had been 
asked over by Ms. Valencia because she was concerned about the applicant and wanted to know if 
they thought the applicant ought to seek medical attention for her wound. Mr. and Mrs. Kellog 
testified that they both recommended that the applicant seek medical attention as it appeared to them 
that the wound in her head was quite severe. These witnesses each testified that when they suggested 
this to the applicant she responded by telling them that she did not want to go see a doctor for this 
injury because it would hurt her workers compensation claim against Utah State University. 
During her testimony, the administrative law judge questioned Ms. Valencia with respect to 
applicant's truthfulness with her health care providers. Ms. Valencia responded that it was her 
observation when she would attend medical treatment or evaluation sessions with the applicant, 
primarily those with Dr. Jane Blackwell, applicant's psychotherapist, the applicant withheld 
information regarding other problems in her life, and focused on her claims against USU. 
Ms. Valencia's observation is verified not only by the testimony of the Kellog's, and Anita 
Buck summarized above, but by documents from Utah State University (see Exhibits D-2,3,4,9-13) 
showing that for several months prior to her trip to McGaheysville and Baltimore, the applicant had 
been having difficulties with her employer regarding her job performance. During the testimony of 
Dr. Bertoch, these documents were identified and received into evidence which, along with Dr. 
Bertoch's testimony, show clearly that from at least December of 1991, the applicant was aware of 
concerns expressed by members of her tenure committee regarding issues surrounding the advanced 
psychometrics program she had been hired to establish. She also had requested that two of the 
members of this committee be removed. This request was denied by the Dean of the department. 
Additionally, during this same time frame (December 1991 through March 1992) applicant had 
accused two students of cheating. Her accusation was not supported in the review process. Finally, 
Dr. Bertoch testified that the applicant had had over a year to produce a course syllabus for her 
advanced psychometric program and had failed to do so. According to Dr. Bertoch, the faculty 
position that the applicant held at USU had been created for the very purpose of providing a graduate 
level psychometrics program. The applicant never did produce the syllabus. In August of 1992 she 
was notified that her contract with USU would not be renewed when it expired in June of 1993. 
The administrative law judge is persuaded from all of this evidence that this applicant was 
having numerous personal problems both before and after her injury in McGaheysville. Not even 
mentioned in the summary above, is the testimony regarding the turbulent relationship between the 
applicant and Ms. Valencia which also added significant stress to the applicant's life. Yet, very little 
of all this appears in the medical record. Thus it appears that the applicant has not been forthright 
in her dealings with her medical and mental health providers, but rather has attempted to manipulate 
them for the purposes of pursuing her injury claims. This is pointedly confirmed by applicant's own 
statements to the Kellogs and Ms. Valencia after sustaining significant trauma to her head at the 
aforementioned party. Also, Dr. Bertoch testified that given the applicant's advanced education and 
training in psychology, she would probably be aware of the signs and symptoms of brain injury and 
the tests used to detect such injuries. The applicant's own resume reveals that she has had substantial 
experience and training in the areas of neuropsychology and psychological testing (see Exhibit D-16). 
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With respect to the witnesses against her, the applicant argues that given the current break 
up in her relationship with the applicant, Ms. Valencia's testimony is therefore tainted by bias against 
her, in effect trying to impeach a witness she called in her own behalf. However, the corroboration 
of that testimony in so many instances by the other witnesses compels me to dismiss that argument. 
The applicant argues that Dr. Bertoch's testimony is motivated by a desire to protect his employer 
against the applicant's claim. However, Dr. Bertoch's demeanor as a witness was one of apparent 
honesty and candor. As stated above, his credibility was unassailed. 
Finally and compellingly, it was the testimony of three of the applicant's neighbors that she 
is not a trustworthy individual and that she has a reputation in her immediate community of being 
dishonest in her dealings with others. When applicant's counsel enquired into the foundation for this 
testimony, these witnesses produced instances which evidenced a substantial and reliable basis for 
their testimony regarding applicant's reputation for lack of honesty and their opinions regarding her 
untrustworthiness. On the other hand, no witnesses were called to rehabilitate the applicant's 
credibility. Ms. Erickson, the only rebuttal witness called by the applicant, other than herself, 
succeeded only in verifying applicant's arrest on D.U.I charges on August 1, 1993, thus confirming 
the testimony of the other witnesses regarding applicant's ongoing drinking problems. 
On the basis of the foregoing, and as previously stated, I find the applicant's testimony in 
this matter to be unbelievable and therefore find the disputed facts in accordance with the testimony 
which has been given contra to her position and allegations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant was not injured by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment 
with Utah State University on March 26, 1992. The applicant did not sustain a compensable 
industrial accident on December 21, 1992. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claims of the applicant, Patricia Buczynski, alleging 
compensable accidents pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-45 on March 26, 1992 and December 21, 1992 
while employed by Utah State University, should be, and the same are, hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be filed in 
writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In the 
event a Motion for Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of 
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filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response with the Commission in accordance 
with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this day of November, 1993. 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
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